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The Optimum Growth Rate for Population
Reconsidered
K. Jaeger1 and W. Kuhle2
Abstract. This article gives exact general conditions for the existence of an interior op-
timum growth rate for population in the neoclassical two-generations-overlapping model.
In an economy where high (low) growth rates of population lead to a growth path which is
efficient (inefficient) there always exists an interior optimum growth rate for population.
In all other cases there exists no interior optimum. The Serendipity Theorem, however,
does in general not hold in an economy with government debt. Moreover, the growth rate
for population which leads an economy with debt to a golden rule allocation can never
be optimal.
Key words: Optimal population, Serendipity Theorem, Debt, Social Security, Over-
lapping Generations
1. Introduction
It was Phelps (1967) who brought up the idea that there might exist a ”golden rule of
procreation” in the neoclassical overlapping generations framework. In a subsequent ar-
ticle on ”the optimum growth rate for population” Samuelson (1975a) proved − within
the basic Diamond (1965) model without government debt − the so-called Serendipity
Theorem: provided that there exists only one stable steady state equilibrium, the com-
petitive economy will automatically evolve into the most golden golden rule steady state
once the optimum growth rate for population n∗ is imposed.
However, Deardorff (1976) pointed out that the optimum growth rate for population
n∗ of Samuelson (1975a) is not optimal in general. In the special case where both the
utility and the production function are of the Cobb-Douglas type utility takes on a global
minimum at the n∗ of Samuelson. Deardorff also proved that there always exists an
optimal corner solution where n∗ = −δ as long as the elasticity of substitution between
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capital and labor remains bound above unity. This discussion has been supplemented
by Michel and Pestieau (1993), who treat the special case of a CES/CIES framework.
After all, the debate can be summarized as follows: granted that the respective
elasticities of substitution (in consumption and more importantly production) are not
”too large” there does exist an interior optimum growth rate for population n∗ > −δ
in the planned economy. The greatest deficiency in this discussion appears to be the
fact that it was necessary to resort to a multitude of special cases in order to examine
the significance of the Serendipity Theorem. Especially since Samuelson (1976) points
out, that the respective elasticities of substitution are hard to estimate and are prone
to change once the growth rate for population is altered.
2. Method and Principal Results
The intention with this essay is twofold:
1. In a first step we will, contrary to the foregoing essays, use a laissez faire framework
to derive exact general sufficient conditions for the existence of an interior optimum
growth rate for population in the Diamond (1965) model without government debt.
2. In a second step we will reconsider the validity of the results of Samuelson (1975a)
in the general Diamond (1965) model with government debt.
With respect to the first point we will proceed along the following lines: our the-
oretical starting point will be the planning problem of Samuelson (1975a) where an
imaginary authority can set all quantities to their respective optimal level. In a second
step we will discuss a laissez faire framework where the imaginary authority can only
vary the growth rate for population. In this competitive framework we will use the
stability condition to derive a r-n relation. This crucial r-n relation will then allow to
draw the following conclusions:
1. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an interior optimum
growth rate for population in a planned economy and in a laissez faire economy
are identical.
2. The existence of an interior optimum growth rate for population hinges solely on
the change in efficiency, which occurs in the laissez faire economy once the growth
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rate for population is changed (increased or decreased) from the optimal/worst
level, where n = n∗ = r. Along these lines we find that it is necessary to distin-
guish four cases in order to give a complete assessment of the problem of optimal
population. Only one of these four cases has been treated by Samuelson (1975a).
3. The exact sufficient condition for the existence of an optimum growth rate for
population is given by dr
dn |n=n∗
> 1.
As previously mentioned, we will then generalize the foregoing discussion by intro-
ducing government debt into the framework of analysis. In such a framework we find
that:
1. The Serendipity Theorem does not hold in an economy with government debt.
2. In an economy with debt there typically still exists a growth rate n˜ ≷ n∗ for pop-
ulation which leads the laissez faire economy to a golden rule allocation. However,
this growth rate will never be optimal. Instead, the optimum growth rate for
population n∗∗ in a laissez faire economy with government debt will lead to an
allocation where r > n.
3. The Optimum Growth Rate for Population with-
out Debt
3.1. The Planning Problem
The planning problem in the conventional Diamond (1965) model, for given growth rates
of population, can be stated as:3
max
c1,c2,k
U(c1, c2) s.t. f(k)− nk = c1 +
c2
(1 + n)
; f ′(k) > 0, f ′′(k) < 0. (1)
With the familiar first order conditions:
Uc1
Uc2
= 1 + n, (2)
f ′(k) = n, (3)
f(k)− nk = c1 +
c2
(1 + n)
. (4)
3Population grows according to: Nt = (1 + n)Nt−1. The availability constraint for the economy is
given by: F (Kt, Nt) +Kt = Kt+1 + c
1
t
Nt + c
2
t
Nt−1. In the following we compare different steady state
equilibria and hence the time index will be omitted where no misunderstanding is expected.
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Condition (2) describes the optimal distribution of income between the generations.
Condition (3) describes the optimal accumulation pattern. Taken together conditions
(2) and (3) constitute the two-part golden rule. Condition (4) is the social availabil-
ity/budget constraint. These three conditions define (truly) optimal values c1n, c
2
n and
kn for every given growth rate of population.
By varying the growth rate for population, as in Samuelson (1975a), it is now possible
to choose the best among all golden rule paths, i.e. the optimum optimorum:
max
n
U(n) = U
(
f(kn)− nkn −
c2n
(1 + n)
, c2n
)
, (5)
where U(n) is the indirect utility function for the planned economy. The first order
condition to this problem is:
− kn +
c2n
(1 + n)2
= 0. (6)
The corresponding sufficient condition is given by:
d2U
dn2 |n=n∗
= Uc1
(
−
dkn
dn
+
(1 + n)2 dc
2
n
dn
− 2(1 + n)c2n
(1 + n)4
)
< 0. (7)
Condition (6) describes the tradeoff between the negative capital widening (−kn) and
the positive intergenerational transfer ( c
2
n
(1+n)2
) effect, and implicitly defines the optimum
growth rate for population.
Together conditions (2)-(4) and (6) implicitly define optimal values c1∗, c2∗, k∗, n∗
which characterize the social optimum optimorum.4 However, as previously noted, the
first order condition (6) might locate the growth rate for population where the indirect
utility function U(n) takes on a global minimum rather than a maximum, i.e. we might
actually have d
2U
dn2 |n=n∗
> 0.
The Serendipity Theorem: The representative individual is driven by the follow-
ing maximization problem:
max
c1,c2
U(c1, c2) s.t. w = c1 +
c2
(1 + r)
; w = f(k)− f ′(k)k, r = f ′(k). (8)
With the corresponding first order conditions:
Uc1
Uc2
= 1 + r, (9)
f(k)− rk = c1 +
c2
(1 + r)
. (10)
4In the following we will assume that there is only one unique solution to the first order conditions
(2)-(4) and (6).
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Once we set k = k∗ and n = n∗ so that conditions (3) and (6) hold, we find that the
individual behavior, which is described by conditions (9) and (10), is compatible with
the remaining conditions (2) and (4) for the social optimum. Since condition (6), with
r = n∗, is identical with the steady state life-cycle savings condition, we find that the
values c1∗, c2∗, k∗, n∗ describe a feasible laissez faire steady state equilibrium. This is the
Serendipity Theorem of Samuelson (1975a): provided that there exists only one stable
steady state equilibrium, the competitive economy will automatically evolve into the
most golden golden rule steady state once the optimum growth rate n∗ is imposed.
3.2. The Optimum Growth Rate for Population in a Laissez
Faire Economy
In order to analyze the welfare implications of changes in the growth rate for population
in the laissez faire economy we will assume that consumption in each period is a normal
good, and use the life-cycle savings condition which is given by:
(1 + n)kt+1 = s(wt, rt+1); 0 < sw < 1. (11)
Furthermore, we assume the existence of one unique and stable steady state equilibrium
with a capital intensity k = k˜ > 0:
0 <
dkt+1
dkt
=
−swk˜f
′′(k˜)
(1 + n)− srf ′′(k˜)
< 1. (12)
Differentiation of (11) allows, by virtue of (12), to derive that an increase in the growth
rate for population decreases the steady state capital intensity:
dk
dn
=
−k
(1 + n)− srf ′′(k) + swkf ′′(k)
< 0. (13)
From the life-cycle savings condition (11), the respective factor-prices, and the individual
budget constraint, one obtains the following maximization problem for the laissez-faire
economy:
max
n
U(n) = U
(
f(k)− f ′(k)k − (1 + n)k, (1 + f ′(k))(1 + n)k
)
; k = k(n). (14)
Condition (9), which is always satisfied in a laissez faire economy, allows to rewrite the
first order condition for the optimum growth rate for population so that we have:
dU
dn
= Uc1
[n− f ′(k)
1 + f ′(k)
f ′′(k)k
]dk
dn
= 0. (15)
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According to the Serendipity Theorem, condition (15) holds only for n = n∗. The
sufficient condition for an optimum at n∗ is given by:
d2U
dn2 |n=n∗
= Uc1
[(1− f ′′(k) dk
dn
)
(1 + f ′(k))
f ′′(k)k
]dk
dn
< 0. (16)
Condition (16) reveals that the existence of an optimum or a minimum or an inflection
point at n∗ hinges solely on:
dr
dn |n=n∗
= f ′′(k)
dk
dn
=
−k
1
f ′′
(1 + n) + swk − sr
T 1. (17)
However, a priori we can only say that dr
dn
> 0, if the steady state equilibrium is stable.
Hence it is necessary to distinguish four cases:
Case 1: The economy is growing on a dynamically inefficient (efficient) steady state
path where r < n (r > n) for low (high) growth rates of population n < n∗ (n > n∗).
In this case we have dr
dn |n=n∗
> 1, and the sufficient condition for an interior maximum
is satisfied.
Case 2: The economy is growing on an efficient (inefficient) steady state path for
low (high) growth rates n < n∗ (n > n∗). In this case we have dr
dn |n=n∗
< 1, that is, an
interior minimum.
Case 3: The economy is growing on an inefficient path for all n 6= n∗. In this case we
have dr
dn |n=n∗
= 1 and population should grow as fast as possible. There is an inflection
point in the U(n) curve at n = n∗.
Case 4: All steady states are efficient and the lowest possible growth rate for popu-
lation is best. We have, once again, an inflection point in the U(n) curve at n = n∗ and
dr
dn |n=n∗
= 1.
After these preparations it is now possible to give a complete diagrammatic repre-
sentation of the problem of optimal population in Diagram 1 (the formal aspects to
Diagram 1 are given in Appendix A):
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n
U(n)
n∗
U∗
r = n
U(n)
r∗
r
w∗
w
2
2
1
1
1 1
2 2
U1
U1
U2
U2
1 1
2 2
φ(r)
I
IIIII
IV
w∗
V
(1 + n∗)w∗
c1
c2
C1∗ w
′′
(
1 + f ′(k)
)
w
′
C2∗ = (1 + n∗)2k∗
U1
U1
Diagram 1: Quadrant I is the familiar U, n diagram which contains the respective utility contours
for the laissez faire economy. Quadrant II is the decisive n, r diagram where all planned equilibria are
located along the 45◦ line. The locus of the laissez faire steady state curve with dr
dn
= f ′′(k) dk
dn
> 0 is
ambiguous and four cases have to be distinguished: Case 1: 1-1, Case 2: 2-2, Case 3: 1-2, Case 4:
2-1. Quadrant III is a w, r diagram which contains the convex factor price frontier φ and the respective
indifference curves indicating an optimum (pessimum). Quadrant IV gives the wage utility relation.
Quadrant V illustrates the respective individual consumption patterns for different growth rates (Case
1 only).
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At this point we can note that the factor prices which are associated with the two-
part golden rule allocation − for all given growth rates n 6= n∗ − allow in general to
reach a higher indifference curve in Quadrant III than the set of factor prices which is
generated in the laissez faire framework.
More interesting, however, is a related point which can be found in Quadrant III
of Diagram 1: the conditions for the existence of an interior optimum growth rate
n∗ in a planned economy, where the central authority forces r = n as in Samuelson
(1975b), are identical with those in a laissez faire economy: in both cases it is necessary
that the indifference curve in the w, r plane is a tangent to the factor price frontier,
i.e. dw
dr |dU=0
= φ′(r), and it is sufficient that the curvature of the indifference curve is
algebraically larger than the curvature of the factor price frontier, i.e. d
2w
dr2 |dU=0
> φ′′(r).
This means that regardless of whether we are in a planned economy or a laissez faire
economy: choosing the growth rate for population means choosing a set of factor-prices
on the same factor-price frontier. The convex factor-price frontier, which in general
defines a concave set of feasible allocations, should be interpreted as a surrogate social
budget constraint.
Proposition 1: The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an interior
optimum growth rate for population in a planned and in a laissez faire economy are
identical. The exact general sufficient condition for an interior optimum growth rate for
population is given by dr
dn |n=n∗
> 1. In all other cases where the structure of the economy
is such that we have dr
dn |n=n∗
5 1 in the laissez faire framework there does not exist an
interior optimum.
We prove Proposition 1 in Appendix B. Thus the qualitative findings of Michel and
Pestieau (1993) for the planning problem in a CES/CIES economy remain fully valid for
a laissez faire economy. All specifications, most notably the Cobb-Douglas case, where
there is an interior planned minimum are consistent with Case 2 and the counterintuitive
change in efficiency at n = n∗. In our opinion it is this dubious behavior of economies
with high elasticities of substitution that should be criticized and not the behavior in
the two ”corners” where k →∞ or n→∞ as in Samuelson (1976).5
5At this point we shall note that Phelps (1968) shows for a laissez faire economy that the Cobb-
Douglas case is consistent with what we have called Case 2, i.e. an interior minimum at n = n∗.
Hence, in the light of the Serendipity Theorem, it should have been no surprise to Deardorff (1976)
and Samuelson (1975a) that the ”most golden golden rule steady state” must be a minimum in the
Cobb-Douglas case.
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We can now conclude that the reasoning of Samuelson (1975a) and Samuelson
(1975b) only remains valid as long as the economy behaves according to Case 1. How-
ever, the assertion of Samuelson (1975a), (p. 535) and Samuelson (1975b), (p. 542) −
which was never questioned by Deardorff (1976) or Michel and Pestieau (1993) − that
all economies behave according to Case 1 is wrong.
However, Case 1 is obviously the most plausible scenario and the data in Marquetti
(2004) for the years 1963-2000 clearly suggest that real world economies behave accord-
ing to Case 1. Estimates of the r-n relation for Japan, the USA and a group of 17
mostly developed countries allow to refute the null hypothesis dr
dn
< 1 with a probability
of error of less than 2,5 percent.
4. The Optimum Growth Rate for Population in an
Economy with Government Debt
We will now proceed along the following lines: in a first step the Diamond (1965) model
with internal government debt and the corresponding government budget constraint will
be restated. In a second step we will show that the Serendipity Theorem is in general
not valid in an economy with government debt. The third step is to derive the welfare
implications which stem from a change in the growth rate of population in a laissez faire
economy where the government runs a constant per capita debt policy.
The Model: The Diamond (1965) model with debt differs from the one which was
discussed in the foregoing section only with respect to the government budget constraint
and the steady state life-cycle savings condition.
The Government Budget Constraint: Government debt has a one-period ma-
turity and yields the same interest as real capital and there is no risk of default. In each
period the government has to service the matured debt Bt−1, and it has to pay interest
amounting to f ′(kt)Bt−1. The government can use two tools to meet these obligations:
it can raise a lump-sum tax Ntτ
1
t from the young generation, or it can issue new debt
Bt. Hence we have:
Bt +Ntτ
1
t = (1 + f
′(kt))Bt−1. (18)
In the following the government will simply pursue a constant per capita debt policy
(Persson and Tabellini (2000) give reasons why an elected government might rather run
such a debt policy than use its budget constraint to steer the economy towards the long
9
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run optimum) defined by:
Bt−1
Nt
= b ∀t. (19)
Thus (18) simplifies to:
τ 1 =
[
(1 + f ′(kt))− (1 + n)
]
b = (f ′(kt)− n)b = τ
1(kt). (20)
Equation (20) reveals that taxes can be either positive or negative depending on b ≷ 0
and the sign of (f ′(k) − n), i.e. on whether the economy is growing on an efficient or
inefficient path.
4.1. The Serendipity Theorem with Debt
From the perspective of the social planner the problem remains unaltered: the relevant
tradeoff is still between capital widening and the intergenerational transfer effect, and
conditions (2)-(4) and (6) still describe the social optimum.
The Competitive Economy with Government Debt: The individual utility
maximization problem is given by:
max
c1,c2
U(c1t , c
2
t+1) s.t. w(kt)− τ
1
t (kt) = c
1
t + st; c
2
t+1 = (1 + f
′(kt+1))st. (21)
Thus the representative individual behaves according to:
Uc1
Uc2
= 1 + f ′(kt+1), (22)
st = w(kt)− τ
1
t (kt)− c
1
t , (23)
c2t+1 = (1 + f
′(kt+1))st. (24)
Attainability of the Social Optimum: In a steady state equilibrium the life-cycle
savings condition is given by:
s(w˜(k), f ′(k)) = (1 + n)(b+ k); s = (1 + n)(b+ k) > 0; w˜(k) := w(k)− τ 1(k),(25)
where s > 0 is an obvious restriction since negative savings would lead to negative old age
consumption. We will now examine whether the social optimum (c1∗, c2∗, n∗, k∗), which
is characterized by (2)-(4) and (6), is a feasible laissez faire steady state equilibrium:
once we set k = k∗ and n = n∗, conditions (3) and (6) hold. According to (20) we have
τ 1(k∗) = 0 and the individual budget constraint becomes the same as the availability
10
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constraint. In this case the individual will voluntarily choose c1∗ and c2∗. The last thing
is to check the steady state life-cycle savings condition:
s∗ = (1 + n∗)k∗ =
c2∗
(1 + n∗)
6= (1 + n∗)(k∗ + b); ∀b 6= 0. (26)
This means that since internal debt leads to the substitution of capital with debt (paper)
in the portfolio of the representative individual the Serendipity Theorem does not hold.
Thus the only way to decentralize the social optimum is to reduce per capita debt to
zero.
4.2. The Optimum Growth Rate for Population in a Laissez
Faire Economy with Debt
Comparison of the social optimum and the individual behavior revealed that the Serendip-
ity Theorem does not hold in the Diamond model with internally held debt. We will
now assess the question of optimal population in a competitive economy. Two related
points will be discussed:
1. A change in the constant debt policy for a given growth rate for population.
2. A change in the growth rate for population for a given debt policy.
Temporary Equilibrium: As De La Croix and Michel (2002) point out, there
are several conditions which have to be met in each period to allow for a meaningful
temporary equilibrium:
st−1 > 0, (27)
w˜(kt, b) = w(kt)− τ
1(kt) = w(kt)− b(f
′(kt)− n) > 0, (28)
s(w˜(kt, b), f
′(kt+1)) = (1 + n)(kt+1 + b) > (1 + n)b. (29)
While (27) ensures positive consumption of the old generation, w˜ in (28) describes that
the income after taxes of the current young individuals must be positive. Condition (29)
must hold to allow for a positive capital intensity.
Steady State Equilibrium: In order to carry out the following comparative static
(in per capita terms) analysis, it is necessary to determine the signs of dk
dn
and dk
db
. As
in Diamond (1965), we will assume that there exists one unique stable steady state at
k = k˜:
0 <
dkt+1
dkt
=
−sw˜(k˜ + b)f
′′(k˜)
(1 + n)− srf ′′(k˜)
< 1; 0 < sw˜ < 1; k˜ > 0. (30)
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Total differentiation of the life-cycle savings condition (25) with db = 0 leads to:
dk
dn |db=0
=
k + (1− sw˜)b
srf ′′ − (1 + n)− sw˜(k + b)f ′′
< 0. (31)
The sign in the denominator of the expression (31) is negative by virtue of the stability
condition (30). The assumption of normality (0 < sw˜ < 1) and conditions (27) and
(29) reveal that the sign of the numerator is positive. Total differentiation of (25) with
dn = 0 yields:
dk
db |dn=0
=
(1 + n) + sw˜(f
′ − n)
srf ′′ − (1 + n)− sw˜f ′′(k + b)
< 0. (32)
With 0 < sw˜ < 1, the sign in the numerator of (32) must be positive. The sign of the
denominator is negative according to (30).
Once the signs of dk
dn
and dk
db
are known to be negative the key elements to our question
can be displayed in Diagram 2.
n
k
k∗
n˜ n∗ n˜
(a)
1
1
1’
1’
2
2
2’
2’
kn
n
k
kn
n∗ n˜n˜
(b)
4
4
4’
4’
3’
3’
3
3
k∗
Diagram 2: The kn line gives the respective golden rule capital intensities and separates the efficient
from the inefficient equilibria. For the laissez faire steady state curves, it is once again necessary to
distinguish Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4. Once the government issues debt (the debt loci have an apostrophe)
these loci shift according to dk
db
< 0 and the growth rate of population which leads to a golden rule
allocation changes from n∗ to n˜. The Serendipity Theorem does not hold in this case.
Debt and Welfare: After these preparations, the Diamond (1965) result concerning
the welfare implications of a change in the constant per capita internal debt policy can
be reproduced: from the life-cycle savings condition (25) and the respective factor-prices
one obtains the following indirect utility function:
U(c1, c2) = U
(
f(k)− kf ′(k)− (1 + n)(k + b)− τ 1(k), (1 + f ′)(1 + n)(k + b)
)
.(33)
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Using (20) allows to rewrite (33):
U(c1, c2) = U
(
f(k)− kf ′(k)− (1 + n)k − (1 + f ′(k))b, (1 + f ′(k))(1 + n)(k + b)
)
.
The first order condition for the optimum debt policy is given by:
dU
db
= Uc1(n− f
′)
(
1 +
(k + b)
(1 + f ′)
f ′′
dk
db
)
T 0. (34)
Equation (34) reveals that the sign of dU
dn
depends solely on the sign of (n− f ′). Hence
an increase of per capita debt increases (decreases) per capita utility if the economy is
experiencing over-accumulation (under-accumulation) in the steady state equilibrium.
Thus, debt should be issued (recovered) up to the point where golden rule growth is
attained.
Population Growth and Welfare: The same indirect utility function can now be
used to derive the welfare implications which originate from changes in the growth rate
for population:
U(c1, c2) = U
(
f(k)− kf ′(k)− (1 + n)k − (1 + f ′(k))b, (1 + f ′(k))(1 + n)(k + b)
)
.
The first derivative with respect to the growth rate of population is:
dU
dn
= −Uc1
(
[(k + b)f ′′ + (1 + n)]
dk
dn
+ k
)
+ Uc2
(
[(1 + n)(1 + f ′) + f ′′(1 + n)(b+ k)]
dk
dn
+ (1 + f ′)(k + b)
)
. (35)
Using (22), we obtain:
dU
dn
= Uc1b+ Uc1
(n− f ′)(k + b)
1 + f ′
f ′′
dk
dn
T 0; dk
dn
< 0. (36)
The first order derivative (36) contains two elements: the first element Uc1b > 0 (for
b > 0) is the biological interest rate effect, which suggests that population should grow
as fast as possible. The reason for the appearance of the biological interest argument
is the following: each young individual buys government debt amounting to (1 + n)b
and pays taxes (f ′(k) − n)b. Hence the young individual hands over a total amount
of (1 + f ′(k))b to the government. In the retirement period the government serves its
obligations and pays (1 + f ′(k))(1 + n)b.
Thus the individual receives the biological rate of interest (1 + n) on its total pay-
ments. This also reveals that the total amount of resources which is transferred into
the retirement period, at the biological rate of interest, depends on the rate of interest
(1 + f ′(k)) and hence, via the capital intensity, on the growth rate of population.
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The second element Uc1
(n−f ′)(k+b)
1+f ′
f ′′ dk
dn
describes the factor-price effects which origi-
nate from a change in the growth rate of population. An increase in n leads to a fall in
k, which increases the interest rate payed on capital and debt, and decreases wages.
In the special case b = 0, (36) degenerates into (15) where dU
dn
= 0 for n = n∗, and
at n∗ the pair of factor-prices w(k(n∗)), r(k(n∗)) ensure maximum (minimum) lifetime
utility. The tradeoff is solely between wages and interest.
In the case b 6= 0 the situation differs fundamentally: as (36) indicates, the tradeoff
is now between what we will call the aggregate factor-price effects and the biological
interest rate. The growth rate which maximizes (minimizes) laissez faire utility in an
economy with government debt will be referred to as n∗∗. We can note that n∗∗ is larger
(for Case 1, b > 0) than the growth rate n˜ which causes a golden rule allocation, and
it may or may not be larger than n∗. The conditions which have to be met to allow
for a laissez faire optimum at n∗∗ remain, compared to the case without debt, basically
unaltered with dr
dn
> 1; the only additional condition is that the difference (n−f ′(k(n)))
must increase sufficiently to allow for an interior optimum at n∗∗.
Proposition 2: In a laissez faire economy with constant per capita government debt
the growth rate of population, which leads to a golden rule allocation, can never be
optimal.
Using Case 1 with b > 0 as the example, the foregoing discussion concerning the opti-
mum growth rate of population in an economy with government debt can be summarized
in Diagram 3:
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4.2. The Optimum Growth Rate for Population in a Laissez Faire
Economy with Debt 5.
n
U
n˜ n∗∗ n∗
U∗∗
U˜
r = n
U(n)
r˜
r∗∗
r∗
r
w∗w∗∗w˜
w 1’
1’
1
1
U1
U1
U1,b=0
φ(r)
Diagram 3: The optimum growth rate for population in a laissez faire economy (Case 1, b > 0) with
government debt.
Diagram 3 illustrates that the optimum growth rate for population n∗∗ is larger than
n˜. Compared to the case without debt the preference ordering in the w, r quadrant
is changed since the interest rate is not only determining the relative price of future
consumption; it also determines the total amount of resources which go through the
hands of the government and yield the biological interest rate. Thus the indifference
curves with debt U¯1 and U¯1 may intersect the indifference curve U¯1,b=0. At the optimum
growth rate for population n∗∗, which might be larger, smaller or equal to the optimal
n∗ of Samuelson (1975a), we have (n∗∗ − f ′(k(n∗∗))) < 0. Hence, according to (34), the
government can always improve steady state utility through a reduction of per capita
debt. The (social) optimum optimorum would once again be reached at n∗ with b = 0
(the U(n) curve for the planned economy is not included in Diagram 3).
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5. Concluding Remarks
In the first section we developed a general approach to the problem of optimal population
in the Diamond (1965) model without government debt. This led to the conclusion that:
1. The qualitative necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an interior
optimum growth rate for population in a planned and in a laissez-faire economy
are identical. In both cases it is the convex factor-price frontier which can be
interpreted as the social budget constraint. Hence we have shown that the findings
of Michel and Pestieau (1993) for the planned economy remain also valid in the
more interesting and realistic case of a laissez faire framework.
2. There always exists an interior optimum in an economy where low (high) growth
rates for population lead to over-accumulation (under-accumulation). The general
sufficient condition for an interior optimum in a laissez-faire as well as a planned
economy is hence given by dr
dn |n=n∗
> 1. All cases where there exists an interior
minimum, like the Cobb-Douglas case, are consistent with an economy, where
rapid population growth leads to overaccumulation and where low or negative
growth rates for population lead to under accumulation.
3. An increase in the growth rate for population increases (decreases) steady state
welfare only if the economy is growing on an inefficient (efficient) steady state
path.
In a second step we generalized the discussion by introducing government debt. In such
a framework we find that:
1. Due to the substitution between debt and capital in the portfolios of the repre-
sentative individuals, the Serendipity Theorem does not hold anymore. However,
except for the case of permanent efficiency there still exists at least one growth
rate for population n˜, which leads the laissez faire economy to (two-part) golden
rule growth.
2. In a laissez faire economy with constant per capita debt, the growth rate for pop-
ulation n˜, which leads to a golden rule allocation can never be optimal since it
only balances the wage-interest tradeoff. The optimum growth rate for popula-
tion balances the tradeoff between factor-prices and the internal rate of return of
16
Bthe pension/debt scheme. Such an optimum growth rate leads the competitive
economy to an allocation where the marginal productivity of capital exceeds the
optimum growth rate for population.
A Appendix
The formal aspects to Diagram 1: The factor-price frontier is given by:
w = φ(r);
dw
dr
= φ′(r) = −k;
d2w
dr2
= φ′′(r) =
−1
f ′′
.
The indifference curve of the representative individual in the w, r plane is:
U = U(w, r);
dw
dr |dU=0
=
−s(w, r)
(1 + r)
;
d2w
dr2 |dU=0
=
sws(w, r)− sr(1 + r) + s(w, r)
(1 + r)2
.
Using the Serendipity Theorem we can show that the first order condition for a laissez
faire/planned optimum at an interior n∗ is satisfied if φ′(r) = dw
dr |dU=0
at n∗:
− k∗ +
c2∗
(1 + n∗)2
= 0⇔ −k∗ =
−s∗
(1 + f ′(k(n∗)))
; f ′(k(n∗)) = n∗; c2∗ = (1 + n∗)s∗.
Q.E.D.
Now we will show that the sufficient condition d
2w
dr2 |dU=0
> φ′′(r) can be transformed
into f ′′(k) dk
dn
> 1, which was our sufficient condition (compare with (16) and (17)) for a
laissez faire optimum at n∗:
sws(w, r)− sr(1 + r) + s(w, r)
(1 + r)2
>
−1
f ′′
;
at the stationary point we have s = (1 + n)k and n = n∗ = r, and hence:
sw(1 + n)k − sr(1 + n) + (1 + n)k
(1 + n)
>
−1
f ′′
(1 + n),
this can be rearranged such that:
− k <
1
f ′′
(1 + n) + swk − sr,
with 1
f ′′
(1+n) + swk− sr < 0 by virtue of the stability condition (12). Thus we obtain:
−k
1
f ′′
(1 + n) + swk − sr
> 1 ⇔ f ′′(k)
dk
dn
> 1.
Q.E.D.
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BB Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: It flows directly from the Serendipity Theorem that the
first order conditions for the existence of an interior n∗ in the planned economy and
the laissez faire economy both identify the same stationary point; for n = n∗ = r∗,
conditions (6) and (15) are both satisfied.
We will now prove that the same is true for the sufficient conditions. Thus we have
to show that the sufficient condition for an optimal interior n∗ in the planned economy
is only satisfied if −k1
f ′′
(1+n)+swk−sr
> 1 at the stationary point.
The second order derivative of the indirect utility function (5) for the planned econ-
omy was given by:
d2U
dn2 |n=n∗
= Uc1
(
−
dkn
dn
+
(1 + n)2 dc
2
n
dn
− 2(1 + n)c2n
(1 + n)4
)
T 0. (37)
The sign of this second order derivative hinges on two distinct elements: the first element
dkn
dn
is the aspect of optimal capital accumulation. The second element
(1+n)2
dc2n
dn
−2(1+n)c2n
(1+n)4
is concerned with the optimal consumption pattern.
From the first order condition for the optimal capital accumulation pattern we have:
rn = f
′(kn) = n,
dkn
dn
=
1
f ′′(kn)
. (38)
For the second element, which is concerned with the optimal consumption pattern,
we find that in a planned economy we have:
Uc1(c
1
n, c
2
n)
Uc2(c1n, c
2
n)
= 1 + n,
wn = f(kn)− nkn = c
1
n +
c2n
(1 + n)2
.
These two equations clearly define an optimal consumption pattern c1n and c
2
n, where
c2n = (1 + n)s(wn, rn); once the individual faces the biological rate of interest it will
voluntarily (for all given real wages wn) choose the optimal (biological) consumption
pattern (Samuelson (1958) and Cass and Yaari (1966)). Hence:
dc2n
dn
=
d[(1 + n)s(wn, rn)]
dn
= s(wn, rn) +
(
sw
dwn
dn
+ sr
drn
dn
)
(1 + n), (39)
with:
drn
dn
= 1;
dwn
dn
= f ′(kn)
dkn
dn
− kn − n
dkn
dn
= −kn.
18
REFERENCES B
We can now substitute the expressions in (38) and (39) into (37) to evaluate the sign of
d2U
dn2
at the stationary point, where we have c2∗n = (1 + n
∗)s(w∗, r∗) = (1 + n∗)2k∗:
d2U
dn2 |n=n∗
= Uc1
(
−
1
f ′′(k∗)
+
(1 + n∗)3k∗ + (−swk
∗ + sr)(1 + n
∗)3
(1 + n∗)4
−
2(1 + n∗)3k∗
(1 + n∗)4
)
.
Hence d
2U
dn2 |n=n∗
is negative if:
− k∗ < (1 + n∗)
1
f ′′(k∗)
+ swk
∗ − sr. (40)
According to the stability condition (12) we have (1 + n∗) 1
f ′′(k∗)
+ swk
∗ − sr < 0 and we
find that d
2U
dn2 |n=n∗
< 0 if and only if:
−k∗
(1 + n∗) 1
f ′′(k∗)
+ swk∗ − sr
> 1. (41)
This sufficient condition for a social optimum (41) is identical with the sufficient condi-
tion (17) for a laissez faire optimum at n∗. Q.E.D.
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